Hendrik Godbersen, Susana Ruiz Fernández
per veritatem ad summum bonum, 1:1; published on 16 Oct 2026
Citation: Godbersen, H. & Ruiz Fernández, S. (2026). Subjective Decision-making and Reasoning in Moral Dilemma Situations. per veritatem ad summum bonum, 1:1
Abstract
The aim of this study is to discover the subjective reasons of people for utilitarian and deontological decisions in moral dilemma situations and their dealings with inner conflicts after their moral dilemma decisions on a fundamental level. Furthermore, we aim to find out how people apply utilitarian and deontological reasoning in their “normal” lives. To this end we conducted 18 qualitative interviews, in which eight participants made a utilitarian decision in one of the three “classical” Trolley dilemmas (Switch, Loop and Footbridge) and 10 participants made a deontological decision. On this basis, we developed a model of subjective decision-making and dealing with inner conflicts, whose elements showed patterns that are characteristic for utilitarian and deontological decision-makers. People make a rather extensive or rather automated decision in a moral dilemma situation, which is influenced by or justified through reasons based in God or fate, reasons based in personal values, and additional factors, such as the value attributed to the affected persons and the emotional relationship of the decision-maker to the affected persons. People deal with inner conflicts after a moral dilemma decision by, firstly, questioning the situation and their decision, and, then, in a rather rational and/or rather emotional way, by accepting, relativising or externalising their perceived responsibility and guilt. When accepting the responsibility and guilt, people tend to hope for understanding and forgiveness, and/or try to balance their guilt through good deeds. Additionally, we found out that people do not clearly distinguish between utilitarian and deontological rationales in their “normal” lives, but rather employ different rationales in moral decision-making.